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Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have grown fast in WAEMU surprising political 
decision makers. They reacted by setting up in the late 90's, a specific legislation. A legal 
usury rate for credits was defined fixing the borrower ceiling interest rate at 27 percent per 
year for microfinance institutions and 18 percent for banks. This statutory frame, fast 
elaborated, revealed early its incapacities and therefore, weakened structures in charge of 
the regulation of the sector. This structure is confronted with the difficult choice to maintain 
institutions outside the statutory frame or to apply a rigorous supervision and to precipitate 
a massive decline of MFIs. This law limits incentives to better governance, the efficiency and 
the flexibility expected from a good statutory frame. This paper models the behaviour of 
microfinance institutions in the context of interest rate ceilings and requirement of a 
minimal level of governance. We use comparative statics to show that a relaxation of the 
constraint on the usury rate does not lead necessarily to an increase of the borrower 
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The financial liberalization policies of the 80s in Africa led to the 
implementation of a specific legislation for microfinance institutions in the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This legislation and 
the usury law which followed put an upper limit on the interest rate of banks 
at 18 per cent and that of microfinance institutions at 27 per cent. The 
process of fixing the usury rate was often questioned and propositions of 
improvement sometimes suggested (Baudassé and Lavigne, 2000). In 
developing countries, the risk of a bad legislation can not be dismissed. The 
inadequate legislations reduce transactions and efficient functioning of 
markets (Coetzee and Goldblatt, 1998). That is true for the financial 
legislations and in particular for the microfinance sector in Africa, which is 
dominated by the informal practices. The cost of an inappropriate legislation 
could be socially high in this context where the products of saving are not 
very diversified.  
 
The fixation of different thresholds of usury for banks and 
microfinance institutions supports the idea that the credit charge and the 
risks taken in microfinance are different from those of banks. It is not only a 
question of guaranteeing the efficiency of the microfinance market but also 
to set up a protection against high interest rates. We find this idea from the 
scholasticism for whom, little lenders could become a powerful oligopoly 
which fixes high interest rates allowing an overexploitation of the borrowers in case of insufficient competition (Baudassé and Lavigne, 2000). This idea of 
protection appears also with Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998 ) for whom, an 
usury law which restricts the level of interest rates plays a role of social 
insurance by imposing a transfer of income from the lenders to the 
borrowers because marginal utility of capital is stronger with the laters than 
the firsts who are in a situation of abundance. But for Adam Smith, setting 
up a threshold of usury helps solving problems of anti-selection, the lenders 
will probably being attracted by high interest rates offered by adventurers at 
all do not worried about a fund repayment (Baudassé and Lavigne, 2000; 
Diatkine, 2002).  
 
 
On the other hand, the argument of efficiency in favour of an interest 
rate ceiling is that the lenders face a legal ceiling will try to minimize the 
costs of credit to maximize their profit margin. The liberal economists think 
that imposing a threshold of usury reduces the possibility of reaching 
Pareto's optimum where lender and borrowers can not any more, one and\or 
the other one, under certain conditions, improve their satisfaction. The 
suspension of loan beyond the usury interest rate reduces not only the 
satisfaction of the lender but also that of the borrower who was ready to pay 
this price but sees itself speechless of an usury loan, without as far as one 
other loan at better rate is offered to him (Baudassé and Lavigne, op. cit.). 
But these arguments on the efficiency ignore the weakness of the State of 
law in the countries where rule on usury law can be circumvented without 
outlawyers are neither discovered nor punished by the regulator. What useful is a regulation on usury in this areas and what would be the 
behaviour of microfinance institutions in front of its respect, given that the 
good governance has a cost? What would be the cost of governance 
supported when respecting the legislation, which would avoid an attempt of 
distortion of the usury law? Is it possible to find a threshold of usury 
compatible with a level of governance which would incentive to conform to 
legal rate? This paper analyzed the behaviour of microfinance institutions 
under the legal threshold of usury and impacts in terms of costs for MFIs on 
governance and interest rates. This paper joins in the continuance of 
preliminary works on the level of global actual microfinance interest rate 
exceeding the legal threshold of usury prescribes by the law. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. The second section presented the fundamental 
principles of a good rule and noticed as they are not gathered for the 
microfinance in the WAEMU. Section three developed a cost-benefit analysis 
which helps to determine the conditions of respect for the statutory frame by 
the microfinance institution. This model is based on the classic objective of 
profit maximisation for microfinance institutions. The fourth section was 
dedicated to the statics comparative analysis. Section five presents the policy 
implications and the latest discusses about concluding remarks.  
 
2. Regulation principles 
 
To make a success of microfinance legislation, five principles are 
required as objectives (Staschen, 1999; Valenzuela and Young, 1999; Fiebig, 
2001). These are the promotion of a neutral competition, the promotion of efficiency, the promotion of a structure of incentive governance, flexibility of 
the law and finally the guarantee of a positive cost - profit perspective for 
institutions which conform to the law. 
  
A neutral and equitable competition has to be the objective of the law. 
No particular measure has to induce a distortion in the competition between 
the financial institutions. The efficiency of microfinance institutions 
supposes an effective framework statutory. Regulation means to set up a law 
and keep institutions remain within it. Regulation has to assure an 
allocative efficiency, operational and dynamic efficiency (Fiebig, 2001). 
Allocative efficiency consists in an optimal combination in use of financial 
resources. Operational efficiency is a capacity to minimize the costs of 
transactions in the financial intermediation whereas dynamic efficiency 
means the capacity of adaptation for financial institutions to the changes in 
their environment. These principles of efficiency, eventually, maximize the 
profit the institution. Staschen (1999), thinks that the first drawbacks of 
regulation is to restrict dynamic efficiency of microfinance institutions, 
notably when the risk of an inappropriate legislation is particularly high. 
Appropriate legislation promotes incentive governance. This third principle 
refers to the mechanisms through which, donors, shareholders and other 
investors make sure that funds will be used in best ways (Hartarska, on 
2005). It is the mechanism which insures a maximal efficiency of 
investments. This mechanism is important because of the difference of 
preferences and objectives among managers and investors (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In microfinance, the application of the internal rules of   foreseen functioning and organization with a legal frame aims actors to a full 
use of capacities to increase through the community interest, their own 
interest or vice versa. The Fourth principle is flexibility. The legal framework 
of the financial institutions has to be rather flexible and evolutive to allow 
technological innovation, free entry and exit, … Finally, when legislation 
bypassing is possible, legal rules have to be subjected to an analysis cost - 
profit. In the countries where supervision is particularly difficult, this last 
principle is decisive in the microfinance institutions choice for respecting 
legal framework (Ouattara, 2003; Lanha, 2006).  
 
In the case of the microfinance specific law in WAEMU, observations 
seem that these principles are not gathered. One can see current works 
among WAEMU countries for the revision of this legal microfinance 
framework (Tanimoune, 2003, Lanha, op. cit.). This justifies the examination 
of microfinance behaviour in this context.   
 
3. Basic model  
The basic model is inspired from McIntosh et Wydick (2004) processes which 
start from a classic profit-function to model MFIs behaviour.   
3.1 Analytical framework  
 
Consider a microfinance institution behaving as profit-maximizer, 
operating in large pool of borrowers, under microfinance legislation. Let 
define by:  
 
-  R, the net income of MFI ; ; 
-  i, the interest rate on loan (borrower or debtor interest rate) ;  
-  i , the legal debtor interest threshold or usury ;  
-  t, credit interest rate on local mobilized resources ;  
-  θ , the unit cost supported on external mobilized resources ;  
-  g, the value of governance indicator for the MFI. This value can be 
approached by the index of notation obtained from the consensus group 
composed of microfinance rating agencies, donors, multilateral banks and 
private voluntary organizations agreed in 2003 to some guidelines on 
definitions of financial terms, ratios and adjustments for microfinance. 
Such ratios are CAMEL, PEARLS from WOCCU and GIRAFE from 
PlanetFinance (see annex) ; 
-  g , standard index in good governance. This level of governance is 
necessary and due for quite MFI approved or which desires to be 
approved officially.  g  is imposed by the legislator and the regulator 
insures its supervision;  -  c, the marginal cost of governance. It depends on the size of credit, 
number of accounts and the degree of decentralization/transparency. But 
in short run, it is supposed fixed;  
-  cg, is the corresponding cost associated to the level of governance of MFI;  
-  J and E indicate respectively specific and environment characteristics 
which can influence the mobilization resources and lending MFI’s 
behaviours;  
-  a, the effort of MFI’s governance. a is observable to the MFI and the 
regulator. a aims at two objectives: respect the threshold of usury and 
improve the practices of governance;  
-  () a ω , is defined as a function of supervision measuring the respect of the 
usury threshold for the MFI.  () a ω  is measured by the regulator but is 
observable to the MFI. This function is defined between 0 and 1 going 
from nearly-non-existent supervision (corresponding in no effort to 
respect the ceiling of usury) to a perfect supervision: 0( ) a 1 ω ≤≤  
with '( ) 0 a ω > . It is a sort of rating which rewards effort (a) to conform to 
the usury threshold. There is a penalty associated to the non compliance 
with the threshold of usury. This penalty is defined according to the size 
of usury loan (see assumption 1);  
-  () a τ , is defined as a function of supervision measuring the respect of 
governance rules for the MFI.  () a τ  is measured by the regulator but is 
observable to the MFI. This function is defined between 0 and 1 going 
from nearly-non-existent governance effort to a total effort (respectively to 
perfect supervision) : 0( ) a 1 τ ≤≤  et  '( ) 0 a τ > . The nature of the supervision determines the effort of improvement in good governance practices. Here 
again, a penalty is associated to the non compliance with the MFI’s 
governance practices. This penalty is defined according to the local 
mobilized resources (assumption 2);  
 
-  P (i, J, E) is defined as a function of loan. It depends on the interest rate 
(i), specific (J) and environment (E) characteristics of MFI ; 
-  Ml (t, J, E) is defined as a function of local resources mobilization. This 
mobilization of lending capital depends on the offered saving rate (t), 
specific (J) and environment (E) characteristics of MFI ;  
-  Me (g, X, E) is defined as the external resources mobilization function. It 
depends on the level governance observed for MFI (g), external 
environment characteristics (X) and internal environment characteristics 
(E);  
-  K (P, Ml, Me) is defined as a cost function, others than interest costs. It 
includes administrative costs for P, resources mobilization costs for Ml 























Assumption 1 : Penalty on usury rate default 
There is a penalty associated to the non compliance with the legal threshold 
of usury. It is modelled as a multiplying term of the effort of respect 
supervision, the quantity of usury loan offered and of the distance with regard to threshold of usury. This penalty is zero for the MFIs which respect 
the threshold of usury. The expression is:  
( ) ( )( ) if non compliance with threshold of usury
0 if MFI respects threshold of usury
aPi i i ω − 

  
Assumption 2 : Penalty on best governance default 
There is also a penalty associated to the non compliance with governance 
rules imposed by the law. It is modelled as multiplying term of the effort of 
supervision, the quantity of local mobilized resources and the gap from the 
level of governance observed to the standard level of good governance. That 
is :  [ ] () ( ,, )( ) l aMt J E gg τ − . The penalty is zero for the MFIs which conform to 
the standard governance rules.  
Assumption 3 : Microfinance deposit environment 
The function of profit supposes that the mobilization of local resources 
(Ml) is independent from the governance whereas the mobilization of external 
resources (Me) is independent from the lending interest rate. In facts, the 
small depositors, often illiterate and little equipped for the control of the 
management, are little interested in the governance, so as the MFI has had a 
repayment problem or bad governance one in the past. As for the donors, 
(Local government or foreign donors) who pursue social objectives through 
oriented funds, they are requiring best governance practices.  
In summary, the variables and parameters of control are for the regulator i , 
g ,  () a ω  and  () a τ  ; a and δ  for MFI. δ  is the ratio of the local resources 
transformation into loan. Endogenous parameters are i, t and g. c and θ  are 
exogenous parameters. θ  is an external parameter. Under these hypotheses, 
the following section presents the program of maximization of the MFI profit.   
3.2 The MFI as profit-maximizer 
 
The net income of the MFI is written as :  
[]
( ,,) ( ,,) (,,) (, , ) ( )( ) ( )
() ( ,, )( )
le l e
l
R iP i J E tM t J E M g X E cg K P M M a P i i i
aMt J E gg
θω
τ




This function of income contains seven constituents, three news which are 
not defined namely :  















-  (, ,) e M gXE θ , the costs of external mobilized resources mobilized with θ  as 
unit cost. These costs integrate interests, audits intended for the donors, 
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subject to :





Max R iT i tM t M g cg K P M M a P i i i
aMt gg




=− − − − − − 





   (2) 
 
The variables J, E and X are omitted for reason of simplification. δ  is 
the proportion of local resources transformed into loan. This parameter 
                                                 
1 The assumption of credit fungibility allows us not to separate external resources from local ones in the lending 
process.  depends on the maximum fixed by the law and of the necessity for MFIs to 
keep liquid assets to satisfy the demands of withdrawal of the clients. For a 
given value of δ , the constraint has to be saturated in the optimal solution 















The Lagrangian of the program (2) is given by the expression:  
[]
(,, , ) () () ( ) ( , , ) ( ) () ( )
( () ( ) () ( ) ()
le l e
ll e
Litg i Pi t M t M g c g KPM M aPi i i
t g g M t M g Pi
λθ ω
τλ δ
− − − − −
−− + + −
 (3) 
λ  is the multiplier of the constraint 
The first-order conditions of maximization are :  
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) 0
LP K P P
Pi i aPi a i i
ii P i i
ωω λ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=+ − − − − =
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    (3a) 
P
i
() ( ) 0 l
l
M MM M LK ll l Mt a g g
tt M t t
τλ δ
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂
=− − − − + =
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    (3b)  l
t
() 0
MM M LK ee ca M l ggM g g e
τ
∂∂ ∂ ∂∂
=− − + + =
∂∂∂ ∂ ∂
     ( 3 c )   e λ
0
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         ( 3 d )  
Expression (3c) gives the quality of governance needed by the MFI. The 
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For analytical tractability, we assume K to be linear in Me, Ml and P. Then 




















        ( 6 )  
From equation (3c), we then write the equality: 
[] ()





a M    and     (7) 
[] ()





, K is assumed to be linear in Me    (8) 
The sign of the expression in right of equation (8) depends strictly on the 
supervision effort of governance rules. If the supervision effort is sufficiently 
strong, the quantity in right of equation (8) would be negative. In this case, 







We have :  0 θ λ −+ <.  
This inequality means that the multiplier (or the 'virtual’ value of external 
resources),  λ  is less than the cost of external resources (θ ). With the 
plausible condition that 
2





, the expression (6) is positive.  
Rational choice for MFI managers is to respect continuously governance 
rules in the specific law of MFI whatever are their cost.  
 
If supervision effort aims towards 0, the right quantity of the expression (8) 
has the positive sign, which c sign. We then have  0 θ λ − +>. In this case, the 
value of the multiplier (value of external resource) λ , is highier than their 
cost (θ ). The sign of the quantity (6) will be negative. In this order and using 
equation (3c), the MFI will respect the governance rules if :  
[] () 0
gg
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∂∂ 1 424 3 123 123
+          ( 1 0 )   
Equation (10) indicates that for  g g = , the MFI conforms to the 
governance rules if the marginal benefit derived from the relaxation of the 
constraint on external resources ( 1 α ) and avoidance of penalties ( 2 α ) are 
higher than marginal cost of external mobilized resources ( 3 α ) and marginal 
cost of governance ( 4 α ). Out of this condition, there is no incentive to follow 
standard governance rules.  
 
Remember equation (10) is evaluated at point gg = , we can rewrite 
this as follow :  
* 0 ()





e c        ( 1 1 )  
* z  is the net value of conforming MFI to the standard governance rules. This 
is possible if   is strictly positive.   * z
From this maximization model, we may be interested in questions as : how 
endogenous variables like lending and saving interest rates and the level of 
governance react to the parameters controlled by the legislator or regulator, 
such as the marginal cost of governance (c), the threshold of usury (i ), the 
standard level of governance (g ), … In the next section, some interesting 
comparative statics analysis are developed.  
 
4. Comparative Statics  
 
The Lagrangian of the program (equation 3) is given by :  []
(,, , ) () () ( ) ( , , ) ( ) () ( )
( ) () ( ) () ( ) ()
le l e
ll e
Litg i Pi t M t M g c g KPM M aPi i i
aM t g g M t M g Pi
λθ ω
τλ δ
=− − − − − −
−− + + −
 (12) 
The first order-conditions are replied as :   
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) 0
LP K P P
Pi i aPi a i i
ii P i i
ωω λ
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P
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Remember that K is linear in Me, Ml, P. we assume also that :  








We totally differentiate each part of equation (12) to obtain (13; 14; 15 and 
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The comparative statics is compiled to identify the signs of  ,  ,   and  di dt dg
dλ  under certain conditions. The sign of dλ  is not important for the 
analysis.  
For illustration, consider the case where 0e t da dc di dg d d δ θ ≠ ====. 
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da , we use CRAMER determinant computing method without forgetting 
that the principal determinant H < 0. The others signs are derived by the 
same way.  
The results of comparative statics analysis derived from the block of 
the four equations are presented in the following section.  
 
5. Policy implications  
Table 1 presents the signs derived from the comparative statics.  
 Tableau 1 : Signs derived from comparative statics analysis  









Marginal cost of governance (c)  +  +  - 
Threshold of usury (i ) 
  
- +  + 
Threshold of governance ( g )  + -  + 
Supervision effort (a)  ?  ?  + 
Ratio of transformation saving into 
loan (δ ) 
- ?  - 
Interest rate on external resources 
(θ ) 
+ +  - 
+ = positive effect;  - = negative effect ;   ? = undetermined effect. 
Source: Results from comparative statics 
 
Theoretical results show that a high cost of governance corresponds to 
high loan and saving interest rates associated to a weak level of governance. 
A decline in the threshold of usury raises loan interest rate, decreases the 
saving rate and deteriorates the quality of governance. A strict respect of 
governance standard rules bringing rapidly MFIs at the threshold of usury , 
raises loan interest rate and the quality of governance but deteriorates the 
saving interest rate. A good supervision through the perfect appreciation of 
governance effort improves the quality of governance but produces an 
undetermined effect on interest rates. A relaxation of the constraint on the 
ratio of transforming (δ ) local resources into loans lowers down the loan 
interest rate and the quality of governance but has an undetermined effect 
on the saving interest rate. Finally, an increase in the cost of external 
resources raises the loan and saving interest rates but damages the quality 
of governance.  
In the other hand, comparative statics suggest a paradox. It is about 
the impact of the threshold of usury on the interest rate. An increase in the threshold of usury would lead MFI to reduce the loan interest rate and 
increase the saving interest rate with a good quality of governance. On the 
contrary, a lower threshold of usury can increase the loan interest rate and 
decreases the quality of governance. This result suggests that a strict loan 
interest rate ceiling would damage the local resources mobilization and the 
quality of governance of MFIs. It seems that what one gains by respecting the 
threshold of usury (penalty concerning the total amount of loans) and by 
improving the level of governance (penalty on local resources mobilized) while 
increasing the amount of loans is higher than one to lose by decreasing loan 
interest rate and increasing saving rate while improving the level of 
governance. The simultaneous increase in saving interest rate and the 
quality of governance is coherent because it allows a sufficient mobilization 
of resources to answer the expansion of the credit.  
Another interesting result suggested by the basic model is that a better 
supervision leading to the increase of in the governance effort (a) has an 
unsure effect on the loan interest rate. In facts, MFIs fix their lending rate 
independently of standards dictated with the legislation. Empirical literature 
through several works, supported this behaviour which outlaws the legal 
rate (Wright and Alamgir, 2004; CGAP, 2004; Ouattarra, 2003; Montalieu, 
2002; Baudassé and Lavigne, 2000).  
  
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper showed that under a regime of interest rate ceiling with a 
standard requirement of best practices in governance, microfinance 
institutions can maximize their profit according to the effectiveness of the 
supervision of the regulator. We use a basic model to show that that the 
effort of supervision determines MFIs to improve their efforts of governance 
but effects on interest rates remain unsure. A too strict respect in the rules 
of governance leads rapidly MFIs to the standard required, raises lending 
interest rate and the level of governance but deteriorates saving interest rate. 
A good supervision through a perfect appreciation of the observable effort of 
governance improves the quality of governance, but produces an unsure 
effect on the interest rate. If the threshold of usury is relaxed, lending 
interest rate will decrease. This means that the conditions of a perfect 
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